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Can some acts of violence be explained by a society's "culture"?  Scholars have found it hard to empirically
disentangle the effects of culture, legal institutions, and poverty in driving violence. We address this
problem by exploiting a natural experiment offered by the presence of thousands of international soccer
(football) players in the European professional leagues. We find a strong relationship between the
history of civil conflict in a player's home country and his propensity to behave violently on the soccer
field, as measured by yellow and red cards. This link is robust to region fixed effects, country characteristics
(e.g., rule of law, per capita income), player characteristics (e.g., age, field position, quality), outliers,
and team fixed effects. Reinforcing our claim that we isolate cultures of violence rather than simple
rule-breaking or something else entirely, there is no meaningful correlation between a player's home
country civil war history and soccer performance measures not closely related to violent conduct.
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1. Introduction 
Researchers increasingly acknowledge the adverse effects of violence on economic development, but 
the causes of violence remain imperfectly understood (Heinemann and Verner 2006, Murdoch and 
Sandler 2004, World Bank 2003).  Our understanding of the role of social and cultural norms in 
driving violence is especially limited, due to inherent empirical challenges. Conventional efforts to 
control for non-cultural factors in a regression framework are complicated by the fact that both 
formal legal and informal cultural restraints on violent conduct reinforce each other and are thus 
plausibly correlated across societies (for an example see Waldmann 2007: 63). Inferences about 
national culture drawn from cross-country comparisons of the incidence of violent acts, such as 
violent crime rates, are also unsatisfying because laws and income levels (two plausible alternative 
explanations) differ across societies and may interact with culture in complicated ways (Becker 
1968).  Moreover, limited cross-national coverage of crime data (especially for less developed 
countries), and differences in crime reporting standards, make it difficult to draw clear inferences 
about the presence of violent national cultures using available crime statistics.  
This short paper implements a novel research strategy to establish the empirical importance 
of cultures of violence. We study violence on the soccer (football) field in the European soccer 
leagues, a cosmopolitan environment where thousands of individuals from numerous countries 
regularly choose whether or not to use violence to achieve their aims.  The European soccer leagues 
offer a natural experiment for our purposes because they constitute a setting where individuals from 
different countries make these decisions in a common legal institutional setting, and where we can 
also effectively control for alternative explanations for violence.  Our focus is on the relationship 
between a country’s history of civil war and violence on the soccer pitch.  The strong link between 
war and norms of violent conduct described by sociologists (see below), combined with reliable civil 
war data across a wide cross-section of countries, allow us to rigorously explore this relationship.   2
Our main empirical measures of individual violent conduct are the number of yellow and red 
cards earned. According to soccer’s official rules, players who commit exceptionally violent fouls 
warrant a disciplinary sanction in the form of a caution (indicated by a yellow card) or a dismissal 
from the match (indicated by a red card). Using data from six of the world’s major soccer leagues (all 
in Europe), containing players from all continents and seventy countries, we obtain a striking 
empirical pattern: a strong correlation between the history of civil war in a player’s native country 
and his likelihood of earning yellow and red cards. Confirming that civil war history captures an 
aspect of culture related to violent acts, rather than general rule-breaking or something else entirely, 
there is no meaningful relationship between home country conflict and other soccer performance 
measures that are not closely related to violent conduct. 
This main result is robust to extensive controls for player characteristics, country income 
levels and continent fixed effects, where we effectively compare nearby countries (for example, 
African countries with different civil war histories). Beyond providing a novel real-world measure of 
individuals’ willingness to commit acts of violence, this finding indicates that some aspects of 
national culture are persistent even when individuals are far from home in a different institutional 
setting, here, a professional sports league. Below, we discuss other robustness checks and the issue of 
player selection into our sample. 
Other studies have used the sports playing field as a laboratory for studying individual 
decision-making under a clear set of common rules – e.g., Smith (1979a, 1979b), Weinstein et al. 
(1995), Chiappori, Levitt and Groseclose (2002), Duggan and Levitt (2002), Levitt (2002), Milanovic 
(2005), Witt (2005), Garicano and Palacios-Huerta (2006), and Price and Wolfers (2007) – but to our 
knowledge we are the first to use sports to explore cross-country cultural norms regarding violence. 
This paper also relates to a growing literature relying on culture to explain important economic 
phenomena, for example Guiso et al. (2006), Bisin and Verdier (2000), Spolaore and Wacziarg   3
(2006), Fernandez and Fogli (2005), and Tabellini (2005), although these papers do not specifically 
examine cultures of violence.  Fisman and Miguel (2008) exploit the stationing of diplomats at the 
United Nations in New York to explore the persistence of corruption norms. 
The next section describes estimation and data, following by the results, and the conclusion. 
 
2. Data and Estimation 
This paper analyses the behavior of soccer players to create a revealed preference measure of 
individuals’ cultural proclivity to engage in violent conduct. As mentioned, actual crime rates are 
unsatisfactory as measures of a “culture of violence”, since individuals’ real-world actions plausibly 
reflect the combined influence of legal institutions and economic factors, in addition to cultural 
norms. We argue that the European soccer leagues offer a setting where individual behavior can be 
studied within a common institutional backdrop, and where we can effectively control for alternative 
explanations for violence, allowing us to isolate the effect of persistent cultural norms alone. 
Soccer’s official rules, the so-called “Laws of the Game,” are provided centrally by the 
Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), the international governing body.
1  Every 
soccer game has one referee with the authority to apply disciplinary sanctions, and the rules establish 
clear penalties for different types of fouls, misconduct, and aggressive behavior. Most fouls are 
minor and occur within the natural flow of the game’s action; these fouls do not earn the player any 
additional punishment. In contrast, when a more serious offense is committed, the rules stipulate a 
disciplinary sanction, in particular a caution or dismissal. A caution earns the player a “yellow card.” 
In these cases, the referee stops the match, calls the player over, holds up the yellow card, and writes 
the player’s name in his notebook.  A player who receives a yellow card continues to play in the 
match, yet the yellow card serves as the first and last formal warning.  
                                                 
1 See http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/federation/lotg2006_e_1581.pdf. Referees have incentives to 
closely adhere to the guidelines: those not enforcing the rules may be assigned to minor games, or dismissed.    4
We define violent conduct as behavior that either deliberately risks inflicting injury on an 
opponent, or that is so excessively aggressive that it carries the potential of provoking a violent 
response.
2  Soccer yellow cards are usually granted for excessively violent fouls, but may also be 
awarded for swearing at an opponent; humiliating the opponent after scoring a goal (with excessive 
celebration); or “diving” to falsely pin a foul on an opponent. Soccer yellow cards thus effectively 
capture our notion of violent conduct. 
In this paper, we also examine red card fouls as a measure of an even greater degree of 
violent conduct.  A second yellow card in the same match leads to a red card dismissal, and in cases 
of egregious behavior a red card may be assigned without the yellow card warning. 
3 When a player 
is expelled, no replacement is permitted, so his team must complete the match short one player. In 
one league where data are available, 40% of red cards were directly awarded for exceptionally 
violent fouls (“assault”), 19% for “professional fouls” (a deliberate act of foul play, usually to 
prevent an opponent scoring and sometimes violent), with the rest for “other unsporting acts”.
4 
Our dataset contains information from the 2004/2005 and 2005/2006 soccer seasons in five 
national leagues (England, France, Germany, Italy, Spain) and one supra-national league (the UEFA 
Champions League), from publicly available websites.
5  We also have data on each individual 
player’s quality as measured by his market value. We obtained this information from a soccer 
management simulation video game; the game features real players and real teams, including each 
player’s transfer fees and salary.
6 
                                                 
2 Note that real-world wars could result from either mechanism (direct attack or provocation). 
3 Beyond expulsion from the current match, a red card often leads to a suspension from future matches; players who 
accumulate multiple yellow cards in different matches in the same season may also receive later suspensions. 
4 Source: UEFA Disciplinary Statistics 2003/2004, page 6: http://www.uefa.com/newsfiles/249438.pdf. The figures 
above exclude “second yellow cards”, since the underlying behavior that caused these yellow cards is not reported. 
5 The data was downloaded from the ESPN Soccernet site (using a Perl script): soccernet.espn.go.com/. 
6 The game is called Worldwide Soccer Manager in the U.S. and Football Manager elsewhere. We use the 2005 and 
2006 releases. The game was developed by Sports Interactive, and the database is assembled by 2500 researchers 
worldwide. We searched for news stories regarding prominent players’ transfer fees to confirm reliability.   5
Our sample contains several of the world’s most high-profile soccer leagues and a 
remarkably international collection of players, drawn to Europe by the world’s highest player salaries 
(Dobson and Goddard 2001). The mean annual salary in our sample amounts to US$1,291,517, and 
the average player is worth US$ 6,323,515 (see Table 1). The main analysis sample includes 5,035 
player-year observations for players from 70 different countries (see the appendix table). To ensure at 
least a moderate amount of information per country, we only consider countries with five or more 
player-seasons represented in our sample, though results are nearly identical using other thresholds. 
There are many more yellow cards (mean 2.43 per player per season, see Table 1) reported 
than red cards (mean 0.15 cards), and in practice we focus most analysis on yellow cards.
7 We have 
information on players’ citizenship as well as on-field statistics (field position, games played, goals 
scored, yellow and red cards). While most players in the European leagues are from wealthy OECD 
countries (mainly within Europe), large fractions are from Africa, Eastern Europe, and Latin 
America, with smaller numbers of Asians (Table 1). 
To determine the nationality of those players who hold dual citizenship, we focus on their 
participation on a national team rather than birthplace. Many players originally from less developed 
countries play for European national teams, and if anything, using this criterion plausibly leads us to 
underestimate the effect of home country civil war history on violent soccer conduct. The best-
known illustration is French star Zinedine Zidane. Even before his headbutt in the 2006 World Cup 
Final earned him a red card, Zidane was well-known for his violence on the pitch and had received 
fourteen red cards throughout his career. Though Zidane holds dual French and Algerian citizenship, 
he chose to play for the French national team and so under our coding rules is French (a country with 
no civil war during 1980-2005) rather than Algerian (15 civil war years during the same period). 
  We control for many of the soccer-related factors correlated with fouls and violence on the 
field, the most important being the player’s field position – defenders and midfielders generally 
                                                 
7 These figures are consistent with Witt (2005) and Garicano and Palacios-Huerta (2006).   6
commit more fouls than forwards, who in turn commit more than goalkeepers – as well as the 
number of games played as a starter or substitute. A player’s age may also correlate with fouls and so 
is included as a further control.  We also control for players’ quality using two different indicators. 
The first one is his success as a goal scorer, measured by the number of goals scored. The second is a 
player’s worth, as measured by his transfer fee (which is highly correlated with his salary).  
We include league fixed effects to address any differences in the calling of cards or fouls across 
countries, and team fixed effects (in some specifications) to capture differences in team quality or 
playing style and tactics, as these represent a further possible source of variation in the incidence of 
yellow/red cards.  The fact that referees have some discretion in calling fouls and awarding cards 
raises the possibility of bias, and one leading concern is discrimination against players of particular 
racial or ethnic backgrounds.
8 To control for such bias, we include world region fixed effects – for 
Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe – in all specifications. These terms also capture any 
other factors, including regional styles of play (“dirty” or “clean”) or region-wide cultures of 
violence, allowing us to isolate variation across countries within the same region. 
Our analysis focuses on the correlation between violent individual conduct on the soccer field 
and the history of civil war in the player’s home country. Specifically, we employ the number of 
years a country suffered from civil war between 1980 and 2005 using the popular PRIO/Uppsala 
Armed Conflict Dataset.
9  Following their conflict classification, we include both “internal armed 
conflicts” and “internationalized internal armed conflicts”, using the comprehensive 25 battle death 
annual threshold. The former are defined as “conflicts that occur between the government of a state 
and one or more internal opposition group(s) without intervention from other states”, while the latter 
                                                 
8 This is not an idle concern: there is evidence of racial bias among U.S. National Basketball Association referees 
(see Price and Wolfers 2007). 
9 We focus on the 1980-2005 period because it corresponds closely with the age of the players included in our 
sample. The results are robust when we look at longer periods, including 1960-2005 (see below).   7
occur “with intervention from other states (secondary parties) on one or both sides.”
 10 We use this 
indicator rather than using other measures of violent crime (such as murders per capita) for two 
reasons. First, even the most extensive (to our knowledge) source of cross-national statistics on crime 
data, the United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems, has 
limited country coverage. Second, as per their own disclaimer, their statistics are “better indicators of 
prevalence of law enforcement and willingness to report crime, than actual prevalence.”
11 
We believe that there are good conceptual reasons to expect a strong correlation between 
home country civil conflict history and subsequent violent conduct.  Sociologists have found that 
war-time killing has a major impact on national social norms and values, fostering greater tolerance 
for violent behavior postwar (see Archer and Gartner 1976, Steenkamp 2005, 253-54).  War’s 
lingering effects are “clearly associated with more homicide and assault, in the ethnographic record 
as well as cross nationally” (Ember and Ember 1994, 622; see also Heinemann and Verner 2006).  In 
other words, a history of violence appears to change norms and local “culture”, making violent 
conduct more socially acceptable, expected, or even desirable. 
Soccer is an intrinsically physical game, where the use of strength may play an important 
role. However, it is usually associated with physical stamina, the ability to push the body to its limits 
in an attempt to win, and retain, possession of the ball, rather than with violence. The main 
distinction is between playing “hard” and playing “dirty.” The view of what constitutes acceptable 
behavior, though, may vary across cultures. As Archetti and Romero (1994) point out, in those 
countries where it is considered a national sport, soccer not only reflects social and cultural processes 
but it is a part of those very same processes. In their words, “football is an arena in which social 
actors symbolize and reproduce by means of their social practices the values dominant in a given 
                                                 
10 See www.prio.no/cwp/ArmedConflict/ for details on the dataset. No extra-systemic armed conflicts occurred 
during 1980-2005 and thus they are not included in our sample. The results are if anything somewhat stronger when 
we exclude the small number of internationalized conflicts (not shown). 
11 For countries with crime data, see www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/Crime-Monitoring-Surveys.html.   8
period” (p. 39), and thus players from different cultures may tolerate different degrees of violence on 
the soccer field. The main implication for our study is that the interaction of players from different 
countries under the same “institutional environment” will reveal these different cultural norms. 
An alternative link between national culture and violence is equally plausible, namely, that 
those societies with a greater underlying tolerance of violent behavior are also those most likely to 
suffer from protracted civil conflicts. In this case, it is the culture of violence that drives civil war, 
rather than the other way around.  We do not take a stand on which of these two causal mechanisms 
is correct, nor do we need to in the current analysis: either way, the extent of civil war in a nation’s 
past reflects the social legitimization of violence, which we seek to correlate with on-field play. 
Note that our goal in this paper is to capture the specific effects of violent cultures, as 
opposed to other cultural dimensions, for instance respect for the rule of law. To capture players’ 
“cultural” propensity to respect rules more broadly, we also control for the degree of rule of law in 
the home country using the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project dataset.
12 
A count model analysis is appropriate for our analysis given the nature of the dependent 
variables, the total number of offenses (yellow card fouls, red card fouls, regular no-card fouls, and 
goals) by player-season. We focus on the negative binomial model (the Poisson model is rejected at 
high levels of confidence).
13  Standard errors are robustly estimated and the disturbance terms for 
each country are allowed to be correlated.  
Our sample of professional soccer players is obviously highly selected. These players are all 
young men with exceptional physical ability, and thus may not be representative of their home 
country’s population in terms of their proclivity to engage in violent conduct. In other words, 
external validity is a potential concern: women from these countries, or people at different ages or 
with worse health status, etc., could behave differently. That said, the fact that the selection rule is 
                                                 
12 These data are available at: http://www.govindicators.org. Summary statistics are presented in Table 1. 
13 We actually do not find over-dispersion for red cards, but negative binomial model results are virtually identical to 
those generated by Poisson. For consistency, we report negative binomial results for all dependent variables.   9
uniform across countries – the representatives of each nation in our sample are young men with 
exceptional athletic talent – alleviates concerns about internal validity. Besides, the fact that 
physically robust young men are the main perpetrators of violence in nearly all societies today (and 
historically) makes this a population of exceptional interest for the study of violence. 
 
3. Empirical Results 
The number of yellow cards earned is positively associated with players’ home country civil conflict 
history at the 99% confidence level (Table 2, regression 1). The home country history of violence 
apparently has a powerful association with violent conduct on the soccer field.   
A reasonable way to judge the substantive magnitude is to compare it to the effects of soccer 
related determinants of yellow cards, such as age.  The nonlinear nature of our estimator means there 
is no single marginal effect of a worse civil war history, so we focus on particular subpopulations 
beginning with players from Africa, where civil war risk is highest. In particular, we consider an 
African midfielder in the French League (the league with the greatest number of Africans) and set 
civil war risk and other variables to the African average. The predicted number of yellow cards for 
such a player increases by 3.6 percent when civil conflict prevalence in his home country increases 
by one standard deviation, or 4 years.  Player age is also positively correlated with yellow cards and 
can serve as a basis for comparison. If the age of the representative African player decreases by two 
years, his estimated number of yellow cards decreases by 3.0 percent, roughly offsetting the positive 
conflict effect. A similar calculation for a representative Latin American playing in the Spanish 
League (the league with the most Latin Americans) also yields a predicted 3.6 percent increase in 
yellow cards when civil war increases by one standard deviation. 
Figure 1 presents a scatter-plot relating years of civil war for each country between 1980 and 
2005 (on the horizontal axis) to the average number of yellow cards earned per player-season, both 
conditional on the control variables included in Table 2, regression 1; the area of the country circles   10
is drawn proportional to the number of player-seasons of that nationality represented in the sample. 
The raw graphical relationship is visibly positively sloped. Colombia and Israel are the two sample 
countries that experienced civil war in every year since 1980, and their players are remarkably 
violent on the pitch. Inter Milan’s defender Iván Ramiro Córdoba is a case in point: over the 2004-5 
and 2005-6 seasons he collected a stunning 25 yellow cards. 
This graphical representation raises questions about robustness to excluding countries with 
long civil war histories (e.g., Colombia, Israel, Turkey, Iran, and Peru), but a series of checks 
indicate that the main relationship is stable when these seeming outliers are removed. The first test 
calculates studentized residuals to identify outliers (following Belsley, Kuh, and Welch 1980). When 
the main model (analogous to Table 2 column 1) is re-estimated omitting outliers, the point estimate 
on civil war history remains large and statistically significant at 0.0093 (z-score 3.47, not shown). 
Additional tests excluding each of the five countries with the most civil war years find similar results. 
The precision of the coefficient estimate on civil war falls most when we exclude Colombian players 
from the sample, but even in that case the main coefficient estimate is significant at over 90% 
confidence (estimate 0.0064, z-score 1.86); the result remains statistically significant at 90% 
confidence when both Colombian and Israeli players are dropped (estimate 0.0059, z-score 1.75, not 
shown), and this relationship is presented graphically in Figure 2. Finally, including the log of the 
years of civil war history as the main explanatory variable also yields a statistically significant result 
at over 95% confidence (estimate 0.0559, z-score 2.30, not shown). Taken together these tests 
indicate that outliers are not driving the main results. 
We conducted a similar analysis using a player-specific measure of exposure to violence 
based on differences in age and the timing of conflict. For each player we recorded the number of 
years of civil war violence experience by his country until he was eighteen years old. The results that   11
we obtained are indistinguishable from the ones we report in Table 2 (not shown).
14  As an additional 
robustness check, we also estimated our results including a variable capturing the number of armed 
conflicts in a country over a longer time period, between 1960 and 2005, and the point estimate 
remains positive, large, and statistically significant (0.0085, z-score 2.37, not shown). 
  The main results are virtually identical when regional fixed effects are excluded, and are 
robust to excluding players from developed countries, where relatively few civil conflicts occur: the 
coefficient estimate on civil war when OECD players are omitted is even larger at 0.0141 (z-score 
4.13, not shown). The relationship between years of civil war and the average number of yellow 
cards excluding OECD players is presented graphically in Figure 3. The result is robust to the 
inclusion of country per capita income as an additional control (Table 2, regression 2).
15 The 
association between home country civil war history and yellow cards holds conditional on the 
country rule of law measure (regression 3). 
The main finding remains unchanged when we control for team characteristics. The point 
estimate on the civil war measure is nearly identical at 0.0076 (z-score 2.24, not shown) when team 
fixed effects are included. The result is also robust to accounting for team quality, measured by their 
league standings in two variables: the first variable indicates if the team finished among the top five 
teams in its league, while the second indicates if they finished among the bottom five . Players on 
top-five teams are less likely to receive yellow cards (coefficient estimate -0.043, z-score 1.68), 
while players in lowly teams receive more cards (0.063, z-score 1.66), but most importantly, the 
point estimate on the civil war measure remains large and statistically significant (0.0072, z-score 
2.48, not shown) when these team controls are included. 
                                                 
14 Results are identical when 21 years of age is the threshold. Results are also unchanged when we control for player 
salary rather than the transfer fee. Another concern relates to referees’ xenophobia (recall that racism is largely 
controlled with continent fixed effects), but anti-foreigner bias is not driving our results: the estimate on civil war 
history is unchanged when an indicator for being a foreigner is included (not shown). 
15 The per capita income data (in 2006 PPP U.S. dollars) are from the 2007 World Development Indicators database.   12
  Throughout Table 2 we control for the number of games played as a starter or a substitute, 
and these variables are likely to be strongly correlated with the amount of time spent on the field, an 
important determinant of cards. The exact amount of playing time is more difficult to capture since 
none of the existing data we are aware of – including websites used by fans, professionals, gamblers, 
and fantasy soccer league participants – reports minutes played.  To make sure our results are not 
being driven by players with minimal playing time, we excluded players who did not participate in at 
least three games (as either a starter or substitute) in a given season, and find that the coefficient on 
country civil war history remains large and statistically significant (0.0102, z-score 2.29, not shown). 
Two additional yellow card findings are worth noting here. First, there appear to be different 
playing or refereeing styles across European country leagues. In particular, the specification in Table 
2, column one indicates that, relative to the English league, there are many more yellow cards in the 
French League (0.264, z-score 4.43), the German league (0.318, z-score 6.71), the Italian league 
(estimate 0.353, z-score 6.51), and especially the Spanish League (point estimate 0.543, z-score 
10.88; not shown).  Second, the same specification reveals that, ceteris paribus, better-paid players 
are more likely to receive yellow cards. The explanation for this finding remains elusive, although it 
is possibly the consequence of high-profile players being targeted for more violent fouls by the 
opposition and thus provoked into retaliation. In contrast, there are few substantive differences in the 
proclivity to receive yellow cards across players’ home region (Africa versus Latin America, etc.), 
conditional on the other individual and league controls. 
  Moving onto other findings, we also studied the effects of civil war history on red cards. This 
is of interest since many red cards are directly awarded for exceptionally violent fouls, yet it is also a 
harder test given the low incidence of red cards.  We find a large positive effect of home country 
civil war history on red cards earned, and this effect is statistically significant at over 90% confidence 
(Table 2, regression 4).  The large positive point estimate – approximately twice as large as that for 
yellow cards – indicates that civil war history is also highly relevant for explaining this behavior.   13
The soccer leagues in our sample compile different information, and only the English, 
Spanish, and the Champions leagues post complete data on regular (no-card) fouls, reducing our 
sample size roughly in half.  Aside from the decline in sample size, we have an important additional 
reason for not expecting to find a significant association between civil war history and regular fouls: 
fouls that do not earn cards are typically less violent than those that do.  In fact, referees are called 
upon in the Laws of the Game to make such a distinction. Regular fouls are an accepted part of 
soccer, in many circumstances are viewed as a natural way of upsetting the opposing team’s flow on 
the field, and in most cases are committed in a fashion that minimizes the risk of injury to both 
players. Perhaps not surprisingly, then, in our sample neither civil war history nor the rule of law 
index are significantly correlated with fouls committed (Table 2, column 5).
16 
  As a final specification check, we consider the number of goals scored as the dependent 
variable, and find no meaningful correlation with civil war history (Table 2, regression 6), indicating 
that civil war history predicts violence on the soccer pitch but not other aspects of play. 
 
4. Discussion and Conclusion 
We exploit the natural experiment offered by the presence of thousands of international soccer 
players all playing within a common institutional environment in the European soccer leagues to 
identify the presence of cultures of violence.  We find that the player’s home country’s history of 
violent civil conflict is strongly associated with violent behavior on the soccer pitch, as captured in 
yellow and red cards, but not other dimensions of play, such as regular (no-card) fouls or goals 
scored. The leading interpretation is that persistent national cultures of violence accompany these 
soccer players as they move to Europe. As Michel Platini, the former French star and current UEFA 
president, put it, soccer players approach the game as “a way of being, a culture” (Kuper 2006). 
                                                 
16 Note that our main finding linking civil war history and yellow cards is robust to using the smaller sample found 
in Table 2, regression 5 (point estimate 0.0079, statistically significant at 95% confidence, not shown).   14
  These findings raise the question of precisely how civil war affects national culture.  Our data 
tentatively suggest that childhood and adolescent exposure to national violence may be the causal 
channel.  We draw this preliminary inference from the fact that the proportion of years before a 
player reached age 18 that his home country experienced civil war strongly predicts violence on the 
soccer field (as described above), while civil war history during the 1960s and 1970s, before most of 
our players were born, does not (not shown).  Confirming this channel more rigorously would require 
extensive survey data of players’ attitudes towards violence, and perhaps their personal exposure to 
violent events, something that is beyond the scope of this study. 
  If individuals can be socialized into a violent culture, then they could also potentially unlearn 
their national culture over time if they moved to a different society, yet our data do not offer strong 
support for this hypothesis.  In a variety of specifications not reported above, we tested whether the 
impact of a player’s home country civil war history diminishes over time for older players, or for 
those with more experience in the European professional leagues, but in no case are these interaction 
terms statistically significant at traditional confidence levels (not shown). Violent national cultures 
appear quite persistent, at least over the timeframe of the typical soccer playing career. 
  We are acutely aware of the need to resist over-interpreting our results.  Specifically, the 
application of results from this admittedly non-representative setting (the soccer field) to broader 
explanations for wars or violent crime should be done with great caution. Yet to the extent that our 
results do generalize, and cultures of violence are persistent and qualitatively important, the findings 
suggest that policymakers need to address cultural factors head-on. Interventions to reduce violent 
conduct might include conflict resolution or peace-building school curricula in post-war societies, or 
community projects to alter prevailing norms regarding the use of violence in high-crime 
neighborhoods. The systematic impact evaluation of programs to modify local culture constitutes a   15
promising and novel research avenue for economists studying civil war prone developing countries 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean  Std.  dev.  Min.  Max.  Obs. 
Rule infractions         
Yellow cards per player-season  2.43  2.73  0  16  5035 
Red cards per player-season  0.15  0.41  0  3  5035 
Regular (no-card) fouls per player–season  13.69  16.78  0  108  2660 
          
Country characteristics         
Years of civil war (1980-2005)  2.74  4.74  0  26  5035 
Rule of Law (2005-2006)   0.85  0.89  -1.76  2.10  5035 
GNI per capita (2006)  26,203  10,923  720  44,260  4965 
 
Player characteristics         
Age   26.0  4.40  17  41  5035 
Weekly Salary (in ‘000 USD)  24.0  27.0  0  190.0  5034 
Transfer Fee (in ‘000 USD)  6,323.5  8,189.5  3.0  78,000.0  5035 
Games Started   13.80  11.48  0  40  5035 
Substitute   3.13  3.89  0  29  5035 
Goalie   0.08  0.27  0  1  5035 
Defender   0.33  0.47  0  1  5035 
Forward   0.23  0.42  0  1  5035 
Midfield   0.36  0.48  0  1  5035 
Goals Scored per player-season  1.65  3.12  0  31  5035 
          
Player region of origin         
Africa   0.07  0.26  0  1  5035 
Asia   0.004  0.06  0  1  5035 
Latin America/Caribbean   0.12  0.33  0  1  5035 
Eastern Europe   0.07  0.25  0  1  5035 
OECD   0.72  0.45  0  1  5035 
         
Soccer leagues         
English League   0.17  0.38  0  1  5035 
European Champions League  0.19  0.39  0  1  5035 
French League   0.15  0.36  0  1  5035 
German League   0.14  0.35  0  1  5035 
Italian League  0.17  0.38  0  1  5035 
Spanish League   0.16  0.37  0  1  5035 
          
 
Notes: The source of the rule infraction, goals, player characteristics, player country of origin, and soccer 
leagues data is the ESPN Soccernet website. The source of the civil war data is the PRIO/Uppsala Armed 
Conflict Database, and the source of the rule of law variable is the Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(WGI) project. Income per capita is measured in Purchasing Power Parities (2006 dollars); source: World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators (2007). Weekly salaries and transfer fees are expressed in current 
US Dollars; source: Football Manager 2005, and World Soccer Manager 2006. 
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Table 2: Empirical Results 
   Dependent  variable: 












  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
Country characteristics           





*  (0.99)  (0.02) 
Log GNI per capita    0.046        
    (1.06)        
Rule of Law     -0.019 -0.143  -0.034 0.0061 
     (0.40) (1.46)  (0.57)  (0.15) 
Player characteristics           





*  (1.02)  (3.20)
*** 




















*** (0.89)  (11.39)
***  (13.65)
*** 






***   
















Goalie           -18.216 
           (54.31)
*** 






***   
Player region of origin           
Africa  0.055  0.173  0.018 -0.112  0.165  0.099 
  (1.06)  (1.45)  (0.18) (0.48)  (1.47)  (0.88) 






***  (0.51) 
Eastern Europe  -0.027  -0.037  -0.056 -0.108  -0.192  0.116 
  (0.43)  (0.43)  (0.57) (0.49)  (1.54)  (1.58) 
Latin America  0.034  0.082  0.003 -0.061  0.084  0.172 
  (0.46)  (1.11)  (0.03) (0.33)  (1.09)  (1.68)
* 
            
League fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  5035  4965  5035 5035 2660  5035 
 
Notes: The dependent variables are per player-season.  Columns 1-6 contain the results of negative 
binomial specifications with disturbance terms clustered at the country level. The omitted categories in 
columns 1-5 are Goalie (for field position), OECD (for region), and the English Premier League (for 
league); in column 6, the baseline categories are Defender (for field position), OECD (for region), and the 
English Premier League (for league).  The league fixed effect results are not shown. Z-statistics are in 
parentheses.  Statistical significance at 90% (*), 95% (**), and 99% (***) confidence levels.   19
 
Figure 1: Yellow Cards and Country Civil War History 
(conditional on control variables in Table 2, regression 1) – All Countries 
 
 
Figure 2: Yellow Cards and Country Civil War History  
(conditional on control variables in Table 2, regression 1) – excluding Colombia and Israel 
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Figure 3: Yellow Cards and Country Civil War History  
(conditional on control variables in Table 2, regression 1) – Non-OECD Countries 
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Albania (ALB)  18  2.88  Macedonia (MKD)  6  4.16 
Algeria (DZA)  6  1.50  Mali (MLI)  29  3.03 
Argentina (ARG)  178  2.91  Mexico (MEX)  8  3.62 
Australia (AUS)  28  2.57  Morocco (MAR)  26  3.15 
Austria (AUT)  6  1.66  Netherlands (NLD)  118  2.06 
Belarus (BLR)  6  1.50  Nigeria (NGA)  43  1.81 
Belgium (BEL)  34  1.91  Northern Ireland (NIR)  12  1.00 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BIH)  14  2.92  Norway (NOR)  20  1.75 
Brazil (BRA)  277  2.44  Paraguay (PRY)  14  2.42 
Bulgaria (BGR)  20  2.55  Peru (PER)  13  1.38 
Cameroon (CMR)  52  2.28  Poland (POL)  30  1.00 
Canada (CAN)  7  3.71  Portugal (PRT)  68  3.02 
Chile (CHL)  10  3.80  Romania (ROM)  19  1.21 
Colombia (COL)  19  4.79  Russia (RUS)  8  1.75 
Congo DR (ZAR)  10  2.50  Scotland (SCO)  37  2.16 
Croatia (HRV)  48  2.37  Senegal (SEN)  59  2.25 
Czech Republic (CZE)  67  2.24  Serbia (SRB)  8  1.75 
Denmark (DNK)  58  1.84  Serbia and Montenegro (YUG)  48  2.83 
Egypt (EGY)  6  1.00  Sierra Leone  5  2.00 
England (GBR)  402  2.17  Slovak Republic (SVK)  14  0.92 
Finland (FIN)  24  1.08  Slovenia (SVN)  11  1.63 
France (FRA)  721  2.48  South Africa (ZAF)  15  1.06 
Georgia (GEO)  10  3.20  South Korea (KOR)  5  1.00 
Germany (DEU)  424  2.00  Spain (ESP)  742  2.91 
Ghana (GHA)  25  2.40  Sweden (SWE)  35  1.77 
Greece (GRC)  22  2.13  Switzerland (CHE)  49  2.40 
Guinea (GIN)  15  2.33  Togo (TGO)  8  0.75 
Hungary (HUN)  10  0.90  Trinidad and Tobago (TTO)  5  0.20 
Iceland (ISL)  8  2.00  Tunisia (TUN)  21  2.33 
Iran (IRN)  9  2.33  Turkey (TUR)  24  2.25 
Ireland (IRL)  67  1.89  Ukraine (UKR)  9  1.44 
Israel (ISR)  5  4.80  United States (USA)  30  0.96 
Italy(ITA) 730  2.81  Uruguay  (URY)  66  2.89 
Ivory Coast (CIV)  49  3.26  Wales (WAL)  26  2.19 
Jamaica (JAM)  9  1.77       
Japan (JPN)  10  1.50  TOTAL countries  70   
     TOTAL  observations  5035   
          
 
Notes: The source of this data is the ESPN Soccernet website. We include all countries with at least five 
player-seasons represented in the leagues for which we have data. 
 